Abstract: When an eavesdropper performs an optical beam-splitting attack in a freespace optical communications channel, it is referred to as an optical wiretap channel, which is an extension of Wyner's wiretap channel model. Even though physical-layer security can be compromised, it is possible to exploit the noisy and degraded channel conditions experienced by the eavesdropper to obtain positive secrecy capacity even when a shared secret key is not used. In our previous work, we found that employing Bessel-Gaussian beams can help to improve physical-layer security and provide higher secrecy capacity over that of Laguerre-Gaussian beams in a turbulent free-space optical communications channel. In this companion paper, we conducted an experiment exclusively with BesselGaussian beams onto which we encoded a pseudorandom binary sequence to emulate data transmission over this optical wiretap channel. Bit-error rate curves for the intended receiver and the eavesdropper were calculated from which estimates of secrecy capacity were derived. We found that the bit-error rate curves for the eavesdropper were consistently worse than those of the intended receiver under several turbulence conditions and that further evidence of an error floor even when the eavesdropper uses an optical amplifier is promising for secure communications.
Introduction
Free-Space optical (FSO) communications over an atmospheric channel using information-carrying laser beams can provide high directionality and high data rate transmission between buildings or between moving platforms when the line of sight is maintained. This can be crucial in situations where an optical fiber infrastructure is either non-existent or hard to establish. Over relatively short distances the narrow divergence of a laser beam makes interception difficult and provides secure communications especially if the beam is initially collimated. However, over longer distance transmission, the beam divergence becomes an issue and atmospheric turbulence, scattering, and beam wander can allow an eavesdropper to capture a portion of the beam. Thus, the FSO system design must take into account both reliability and security issues of the transmitted message.
One of the aspects for secure communications at the physical layer, which arises from the classic solution developed by Shannon [1] , is that it requires the transmitter (Alice) and receiver (Bob) to share a common secret key that is unknown to the eavesdropper (Eve). Alice uses a cipher to encrypt the message and sends it over the channel to Bob who then performs decryption on the received codeword. The simplest way to share a private key while providing unconditional security is the one-time pad. However, the information theory dictates that the length of the key must be at least as long as the message, must be securely distributed and stored in advance, and then discarded after use. Repeating this procedure every time a message is transmitted will become intractable as the length of the codeword grows in size. In addition, Shannon assumed a noiseless channel, which is not a realistic assumption. In 1975, A. D. Wyner developed the discrete memoryless wiretap channel model [2] , which is based on the premise that secrecy can be obtained even when both parties do not share a key. The idea behind Wyner's model establishes secrecy by exploiting the noisy and imperfect channel itself, taking advantage of the fact that in a majority of scenarios the channel from Alice to Eve is degraded compared to that from Alice to Bob, which is typically true for FSO communications links. The mathematical formulation yielded a metric known as secrecy capacity in which communications are considered to be secure if the secrecy capacity stays positive. Intuitively the secrecy capacity is the highest data capacity at which Eve is unable to obtain information transmitted from Alice to Bob.
Research on physical-layer security (PLS) in the radio frequency (RF) domain has become a very popular topic this past decade and an overview of those developments are provided in [3] . Parallel research efforts pertaining to security in the FSO domain have also been ongoing and conceptual details along with information-theoretic secrecy capacity formulas for FSO are provided in [4] . Wyner's model can be extended to FSO channels which can then be referred to as the optical wiretap channel. In this context atmospheric turbulence induced refractive index changes serve as the main channel degradation mechanism and Eve attempts optical beam-splitting attacks to covertly extract approximately 1% of the transmitted power without being noticed. Although atmospheric turbulence poses physical limitations on achieving power efficient and spectrally efficient data transmission, it can also be turned into an advantage in terms of achieving secrecy. In conjunction with this secrecy advantage, encoding the data onto laser beams which carry orbital angular momentum (OAM) can potentially increase the secrecy capacity to levels beyond what is achievable with a single Gaussian mode due to their intrinsic orthogonality property.
An excellent review article by Forbes et al. [5] discusses how advances in digital holography with spatial light modulators (SLM) have allowed researchers to create and detect OAM modes for applications in spatial division multiplexing, optical communications, and quantum information science. Another excellent review article by Willner et al. [6] focuses more on the use of OAM modes for fiber-optic and FSO communications and highlights the technology involved in mode conversion and mode sorting as well as multiplexing and demultiplexing. OAM mode transmission through specialty optical fibers and propagation through turbulent FSO channels are also discussed. Further research by Willner's group into the challenges of using OAM modes for high-capacity data transmission over FSO links has resulted in systems engineering guidelines in regards to beam pointing accuracy, divergence, and power loss and their effect on achieving certain levels of OAM mode purity and bit-error rate performance [7] , [8] . Research activities by the Forbes group has leveraged OAM modes in the realm of quantum applications by making an analogy of their non-separable characteristics to the property of photon entanglement to study the evolution of such entanglement in turbulence and to implement quantum key distribution protocols for security [9] - [11] .
For classical security using OAM modes, in our previous paper [12] we performed numerical simulations and experiments with SLMs and compared the secrecy capacity performance of Laguerre-Gaussian (LG) and Bessel-Gaussian (BS) beams. We concluded from crosstalk matrix measurements that BS modes could yield higher values of secrecy capacity than LG modes and that developing technology to generate BS modes with higher quality can help to realize a more secure FSO system. In this companion paper, we devised a data transmission experiment which emulates an optical wiretap channel and measures the bit-error rate (BER) curves obtained at Bob's and Eve's receivers. The experiment was done exclusively with BS beams and under the same turbulence conditions as in the previous work in order to demonstrate once again that positive secrecy capacity can be achieved even in binary channels with direct detection.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the optical wiretap channel scenario. Section 3 describes the experimental setup in the laboratory and presents the results. Section 4 discusses some operational aspects of using OAM modes to securely transmit information. Finally, Section 5 provides the conclusion.
Optical Wiretap Channel Scenario
Wyner's model extended to encompass the FSO communications channel is referred to as the optical wiretap channel and is illustrated in Fig. 1 . In addition to noise, the atmospheric turbulence induced refractive index fluctuations within the channel will impart intensity scintillations onto the information-carrying laser beam. The most practical PLS scenario is where the transmitter and receiver are aligned to maximize the received power and the eavesdropper attack is performed near the receiver. While Eve can perform optical beam-splitting attacks in the channel to compromise PLS, it's possible to exploit the noisy and degraded channel conditions to obtain a certain level of secrecy even when Alice and Bob do not use a shared key for communications. This argument carries more weight if Eve is only allowed to intercept approximately 1% of the signal power. The other boundary case where Eve is located near the transmitter was studied in [4] , [12] . In that scenario the eavesdropping attack is unaffected by the channel conditions, however the probability of the attack being consistently covert is greatly reduced which renders it impractical. Going back to Fig. 1 , when Alice transmits a n-bit encoded message X n , Bob receives Y n over the main channel and Eve receives Z n over another channel. The level of PLS in an FSO system is determined by the secrecy capacity where a positive value is possible only if the channel to Bob is of higher quality than the channel to Eve in terms of signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Secrecy capacity C S is defined as the difference between the mutual information of the Alice-Bob messages I (X n , Y n ) and the Alice-
The entropy H (X n ) refers to the uncertainty in the original message during transmission while H (X n |Y n ) and H (X n |Z n ) refer to the uncertainty remaining in that message given Y n and Z n are received, respectively. From these definitions it is apparent that secrecy capacity is maximized when I (X n , Z n ) = 0 i.e., Eve's uncertainty remaining in the received message equals its original uncertainty and thus Eve learns nothing from the intercepted message.
However, obtaining perfect secrecy requires unconditional statistical independence between X n and Z n which is not possible under realistic channel conditions so alternative criteria such as weak secrecy where 1 n I (X n , Z n ) → 0 as n → ∞ and strong secrecy where I (X n , Z n ) → 0 as n → ∞ are employed. In particular, the strong secrecy condition necessitates that the amount of information learned by Eve approaches zero as the number of transmitted bits is increased and much research progress has been made to put this condition into mainstream use [3] . Returning to the definition of secrecy capacity of the discrete memoryless channel, because I (X n , Z n ) is always a nonzero quantity, Wyner formulated secrecy capacity based on considering X n and Z n as statistically independent given Y n . The goal was then to maximize the difference between I (X n , Y n ) and I (X n , Z n ) which can be accomplished by factoring in the non-ideal channel conditions. For secrecy capacity to be positive all that's needed is for the Alice-Bob channel to be less noisy and less degraded compared to the Alice-Eve channel at the level of the physical layer. In other words, the presence of turbulence in the channel provides the advantage that is needed to achieve security at the cost of some degree of reliability.
The definition has been adapted to the FSO channel [4] where the secrecy capacity from Alice to Bob is denoted as C A B and the capacity from Alice to Eve is denoted as C A E ,Rx (when Eve is near the receiver). The resulting expression C S,Rx = C A B − C A E ,Rx = log 2 (1 + γ b ) − log 2 (1 + γ e,Rx ) in units of bits/sec/Hz, where γ b and γ e,Rx are Bob's SNR and Eve's SNR respectively, resembles the difference between the Shannon capacities of the Alice-Bob channel and the Alice-Eve channel due to the presence of SNR terms. As such, it is clear that as long as Bob's SNR is greater than Eve's SNR the communication will be secure. One should keep in mind that the above secrecy capacity formula only provides an information-theoretic upper bound but does not specify how that limit can be reached. Factors such as the strength of turbulence, the alignment accuracy of Eve's beam-splitter, the amount of extracted power, and the detection efficiency may influence the magnitude of C S,Rx .
At this point it's necessary to reference a numerical study conducted by the Sasaki research team in Japan wherein they reported secrecy capacity and secure key rate performance when using channel codes in an optical wiretap scenario for geostationary satellite to ground links. Taking into account power and bandwidth constraints and using channel attenuation as the main degradation source, they showed that information-theoretic secure communications could be possible at very long distances [13] . This work was followed by a very recent series of comprehensive experimental demonstrations of secure message transmissions over a metropolitan 7.8 km terrestrial FSO link in the presence of an eavesdropping attack [14] - [16] . Their Tokyo FSO testbed consisting of optical communications hardware at the Alice, Bob, and Eve rooftop terminals allowed them to conduct elaborate experiments such as monitoring channel state information in the presence of atmospheric turbulence and varying weather conditions, measuring fluctuations in the secure key rate during different time intervals over the course of a day, and estimating the probability of secrecy outage and the amount of information leakage. With this type of testbed it would certainly be interesting to use it for transmission of binary data encoded onto BS beams and assess the impact on the C S,Rx values.
Laboratory Emulation of an Optical Wiretap Channel
To establish the experiment for transmitting data with BS beams the setup involving Holoeye PLUTO-TELCO-013 reflective phase-only SLMs used in the previous work [12] was moved and re-constructed in a different laboratory area to be in close proximity to the data transmitter and receiver hardware. The diagram of the new setup which emulates the optical wiretap channel on a tabletop is shown in Fig. 2 . The laser used for data transmission comes from a single channel of the Pure Photonics PPLA laser array and has center wavelength of 1550 nm with a narrow linewidth of 10 kHz. The output light is initially guided inside Corning SMF-28 optical fiber and enters a JDSU OC-192 intensity modulator that is DC biased at its quadrature point. A pseudo-random binary sequence (PRBS) is then loaded onto a Tektronix AWG70002A arbitrary waveform generator which drives the RF input port of the intensity modulator to impose the on-off-keying (OOK) format onto the laser beam. The modulated laser signal is then amplified by an erbium-doped fiber amplifier (EDFA) to approximately 32 mW average power. Polarization controllers (PC) are adjusted before and after to maximize the laser power. The light beam is then coupled out to free space as a 3 mm diameter beam by a fiber collimator. Due to table space limitations no spatial filtering or beam expansion was done. The FSO portion of the setup is almost identical to that in [12] except that information-carrying beams are now encoded onto OAM modes after reflecting from Alice's SLM. As described in Section 4 of [12] the LG modes were created using a digital spiral phase pattern displayed on the SLM where the number of 0 to 2π phase crossings corresponds to the mode order. Similarly the BS modes were created by displaying a superimposed spiral phase plus blazed axicon pattern. Visualizations of these phase patterns were shown in [12, Fig. 4 ]. The detection of a particular OAM mode is done by conjugate mode sorting [17] at the receive SLM onto which the corresponding phase pattern of the opposite sign is displayed. Pristine detection of the entire mode structure ideally results in a focused Gaussian spot after transforming into the far field [18] and thus a mode can be unambiguously discriminated from its neighboring orders.
After the receive SLM performs conjugate mode sorting to detect the OAM modes, the beam is aligned to a f = 10 mm focusing lens which couples it into another SMF-28 optical fiber. In order to create the BER curves, a range of optical signal-to-noise ratio (OSNR) levels had to be generated. This was achieved by fixing the signal power and using a noise loading stage consisting of a broadband amplified spontaneous emission (ASE) light source whose output is passed through a 1550 nm tunable bandpass filter (TBF) and finally amplified by an EDFA [19] . The variation in the noise level that's added to the signal is controlled by the JDSU HA9 variable optical attenuator (VOA). The VOA can progressively attenuate the noise power such that higher attenuation corresponds to a higher OSNR. The signal and noise beams are then combined inside a 2 × 2 50:50 fiber coupler with one output going to an Optilab PR-23-M photodetector (PD) and the other output being used for power monitoring. The PD is connected to a Tektronix DPO71604B realtime sampling oscilloscope having 16 GHz analog bandwidth and a sampling rate of 50 GS/s which is fast enough to acquire the detected signal for post-processing by a symbol recovery algorithm. Both the arbitrary waveform generator and real-time scope are connected to a computer running a Python script which coordinates a continuously repeating transmission of the OOK modulated codeword of length 38000 bits at a data rate of 12.5 Gbps. The Python script also calculates electrical SNR from the variance of the recovered symbol amplitudes and this quantity serves as a common reference when selecting the VOA noise attenuation to apply to Bob's and Eve's receivers.
With regards to emulating Eve's attack on the FSO channel we originally considered placing a commercially available 92:8 pellicle beam-splitter (Thorlabs BP108) in front of Bob's receive SLM so that 8% of the light could be re-directed to an additional Eve SLM. However, it was determined that attempting to go that route would cause complications in the alignment and increase the difficulty of the experiment, and needless to say that 8% is beyond Eve's extraction capability. Thus in lieu of a beam-splitter, an absorptive neutral density filter (Thorlabs NENIR20A-C) that causes 20 dB of attenuation was inserted directly into the beam path in front of Bob's receive SLM. Doing this served the dual purpose of attenuating the laser down to 1% of its original power while in effect converting Bob's SLM into Eve's SLM. While the tradeoff came from having to perform each data collection twice, we could argue that this actually emulates the worst-case attack by Eve since 1% of entire beam footprint can be extracted without the need for further alignment.
Initially the average laser power is 32 mW but that value drops after the beam exits into free space and experiences losses due to the polarizer (POL), the half wave plates (HWP), the steering mirrors, and a total of four bounces from SLM surfaces each with 80% reflectivity. Using an integrating power meter to measure the power in the free space beam after the receive SLM gave readings between 1 mW to 4 mW. Therefore, Bob's received signal power is on the order of milliwatts whereas Eve's signal power is on the order of tens of microwatts. Furthermore, this power is coupled into the optical fiber with less than 100% coupling efficiency. Apparently, Eve's signal would be too weak to retain any part of the transmitted PRBS, even when no noise loading is done by the VOA, and as a result Eve's BER curve would simply be a horizontal line at 0.5. Thus, in order to create a meaningful BER curve it was necessary to equip Eve with a constant 20 dB gain EDFA to boost the captured signal. Note that Eve inevitably incurs further SNR degradation from the additional spontaneous emission noise created during the EDFA amplification process.
BS modes of orders 0 to +5 were generated similar to those in [12] by loading spiral phase patterns superimposed on a blazed axicon pattern (with period of 160 pixels) onto the Alice SLM. Because the Bob or Eve SLM performs conjugate mode sorting to receive the OAM encoded data it was necessary to check the evolution the beam in the channel and inspect its structure before conducting the experiment. This was done by positioning an infrared camera to image the beam at three different checkpoints labeled 1, 2, and 3 in Fig. 2 . The captured beam profiles are shown in Fig. 3 , where checkpoint 1 images correspond to the beam made from SLM 1 and checkpoint 2 images correspond to the propagated checkpoint 1 beams just before arriving at SLM 3. Note the rotation of the spiral phase can change direction depending on whether the beam reflects from an even or odd number of optical surfaces in the beam path. Checkpoint 3 images were taken as a sanity check to verify that a Gaussian beam passing by SLMs 1 and 2 (with no phase pattern loaded onto them) could produce BS modes from SLM 3 that are similar to the modes from SLM 1. This ensures that when conjugate mode sorting is done at SLM 3 using phase patterns of the opposite sign the beams associated with those patterns would be similar in size and structure to the arriving beam. Because it was necessary to re-align the beam going to SLM 3 for each order that was transmitted, images of the near-field profiles after SLM 3 were collected to check the alignment accuracy. These are shown in Fig. 4 . For BS modes of order 0, +1, and +2 the near-field shows a prominent central lobe whereas for orders +3, +4, and +5 more of the power is distributed away from the central region. This indicates that focusing with a fiber coupling lens would be inefficient if portions of the beam are outside the acceptance angle of the fiber and the mismatch with the numerical aperture causes coupling loss and undesired spatial filtering of the signal. Our maximum achieved coupling efficiency was 74%, 66%, and 54% for orders 0, +1, and +2 respectively. Clearly the higher the order, the harder it is to generate BS modes of pristine quality for carrying data, not to mention the more stringent alignment requirements. Thus, the experiment only transmitted BS modes of order 0, +1, and +2 and a LG mode of order 0 (Gaussian) for comparison purposes.
Although only a few BS modes were transmitted in the experiment, we were able to generate a reasonable number of BER curves as shown in Fig. 5 to demonstrate that Bob's receiver performance consistently surpasses that of Eve under the same refractive index structure parameter (C 2 n ) conditions in [12] and verify that Eve's channel degradations are indeed more severe than Bob's. Also, the received power measured by Bob and Eve fluctuate with the turbulence in the FSO channel and those fluctuations directly affect the calculated BER values. Because of this the data markers that are plotted represent an average over Monte Carlo runs. The higher the C 2 n , the larger the magnitude of the power fluctuations which could be observed on the power monitor. For that reason, we also plot a dashed line curve fit along with every set of data points to indicate the overall trend of each BER curve. Furthermore there is visual evidence that Eve's BER curve could possibly be trending towards an asymptotic error floor although Eve is equipped with an EDFA, which is promising for secure communications.
To help quantify the positive secrecy capacity that Bob achieves over Eve, it was possible to compute the C S,Rx indirectly from the difference in performance between their BER curves. We did this by first obtaining estimates of Bob's and Eve's OSNR values using formulas in [20] that enabled a mapping between OSNR and BER. We inverted the formula for OOK bit error rate: BER . We emphasize that focusing on the order of magnitude of the C S,Rx is more important than comparing the values among the modes since all of their values can fluctuate with the turbulence strength. In addition, the secrecy capacity of individual BS modes can be aggregated by OAM multiplexing to obtain a total capacity, which exceeds that of the LG mode (which would remain constant on the order of 1 bits/sec/Hz). As reported in the previous experiment, which used crosstalk matrix calculations to compute secrecy capacity [12] , aggregate C S,Rx values of 21.6, 16.9, and 13.5 bits/sec/Hz were reported after propagating BS modes through turbulence with C 2 n of 1.5 × 10 −15 , 10 −14 , and 5 × 10 −14 m −2/3 respectively. Since those aggregate values were obtained by summing over a total of eleven BS orders (from −5 to +5), simple division provides a rough per-order estimate of 1.2 to 2 bits/sec/Hz which is consistent with the measurements in this experiment.
Discussion of Operational Aspects
The results from this experimental demonstration of an optical wiretap channel scenario are fairly intuitive from the standpoint of PLS. Under the worst case scenario, when Eve's receive SLM has the exact same alignment accuracy as Bob's and Eve employs an EDFA to boost the signal level, the fact that Bob's BER performance is still superior to Eve's suggests that secure communication of messages is possible to a certain degree even though no secret key was used. However, all parties (Alice, Bob, and more so Eve) need to address the technical and operational difficulties that come with transmitting and receiving OAM encoded information. The security advantage of using OAM modes was studied in [21] in which physical factors pertaining to misalignment were emphasized. The most critical aspect is to ensure that the intended receiver is positioned on the direct line of sight to the transmitter without any obstructions present along the beam path. Any lateral misalignment will effectively reduce the aperture size of the receiver and any angular misalignment will create additional background inter-modal crosstalk on top of the turbulence-induced crosstalk. Crosstalk leads to imperfect conjugate mode sorting, loss of information, and further degrades the reliability of the transmission. In this experiment, we dealt with these same alignment issues and this restricted us to transmitting only a few BS orders. Even if Eve's beam-splitter could intercept the beam perfectly on-axis, and were adequately large enough to split off power from the entire beam profile, the alignment issues mentioned in [21] would still be challenging to overcome and in conjunction with the degraded channel conditions would result in further data corruption.
Another aspect is the ongoing debate regarding whether BS beams can be non-diffracting and resilient to turbulence over a finite distance [22] and whether or not they are the most optimal set of orthogonal OAM modes to use [23] . In [12] we inferred that BS modes are more resilient to turbulence than LG modes based on the modest improvement in positive secrecy capacity that they provided and those results influenced the exclusive use of BS beams in this work. Nonetheless the study of Bessel beam propagation through turbulent atmosphere remains a popular research topic and there continues to be a constant stream of publications appearing in various journals reporting analytical results [24] , numerical simulations [25] , [26] and experimental findings [27] , especially in the context of FSO communications. Thus the insight provided by these efforts may have to be leveraged for any secure FSO system design considerations.
It's also worth mentioning that the secrecy capacity formula has an implicit relationship with the reliability of the data transmission. Referring to the BER curves measured by Bob's SLM the bit error rate performance can be further improved if forward error correction schemes are employed [28] , [29] . Indeed, progress has been made on devising error correction techniques specifically for physical-layer security purposes [30] . Conversely, the BER curves measured by Eve's SLM are beyond the regime in which forward error correction can be applied and therefore Eve's bit errors cannot be reduced.
Finally, the ultimate goal of any secure communication system is to have a secure key rate that approaches the channel capacity. Obviously if Eve's channel is degraded to the point where Eve only receives noise the secure key rate is limited only by the Shannon capacity itself. In this experiment, an uncoded OOK PRBS was used for a proof-of-concept demonstration but it's known that OOK modulation does not reach the Shannon capacity and cannot provide the maximum possible secure key rate. More sophisticated coherent modulation schemes involving an optimal signal constellation design [31] could in principle be used for future demonstrations.
Conclusion
In this paper, we created an experiment which emulated an optical wiretap channel in order to study how the concept presented in Wyner's wiretap channel model can be extended to the FSO channels. We found that while Eve can perform optical beam-splitting attacks in the channel to compromise PLS, it is still possible to exploit the noisy and degraded channel conditions to obtain positive secrecy capacity even when Alice and Bob do not use a shared key for communications. We also generated BER curves for Bob's and Eve's receivers to show the security advantage enjoyed by Bob even if Eve is equipped with an EDFA to boost the extracted signal and has access to a real-time sampling oscilloscope for post-processing. There's also indication that Eve's BER curves will approach an error floor which will limit Eve's ability to extract information at higher OSNR values. The continued use of BS OAM modes in this experiment maintains the possibility to eventually do OAM multiplexing to aggregate the secrecy capacity values. It's understood that this approach to physical-layer security does not guarantee unconditional security and that in the long run a secret key agreement strategy may have a better chance of obtaining higher secure key rates. Specifically, the implementation of quantum key distribution protocols along with information reconciliation and privacy amplification steps can theoretically achieve unconditional security. However, that study is beyond the scope of this paper.
